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Abstract
The notion of moral space covers all thin (universal) and thick (particular) 
characteristics that may plausibly be seen as morally relevant. In this paper, 
I investigate certain properties of moral space so defined. These properties are 
not easily visible if we analyze moral characteristics individually, but become 
clear once we consider them collectively. In particular, following Amartya Sen, 
I claim that the value of moral properties is, in part, a function of positional 
characteristics. I call this notion the non-homogeneity of moral space.1
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Definition of moral space
Moral space may be understood as the set of moral options, similar to 
a logical space of possibilities, which includes whatever considerations may 
be morally relevant. There are many other, loosely related understandings of 
moral space. According to Tilghman, moral space is understood, somewhat 
metaphorically, as an arena of action. Tilghman claims that aesthetic 
space—for instance a fictitious space in a painting—brings about a moral 
aspect, which may be called the ‘moral space’ of an artwork.2 Another quite 
intuitive use of the term ‘moral space’ heavily stresses its spatial aspect, 
defining it as the part of physical space inhabited by human beings. Moral 
space, so conceived, provides a potential moral value to states of affairs 
taking place in it. Moral space that satisfies this definition can be called ethos 
in its Heideggerian interpretation as the space where living creatures dwell.3 
Moral space also may be understood as a domain within the institutional 
setup of a society which allows for “shared moral deliberation” (Walker).4 
Finally, it can be understood as a geographic or architectural location that 
is particularly hospitable to moral conversations; for instance, the Agora in 
the architecture of Ancient Athens. The latter two senses of ‘moral space’ 
refer to a social or geographical space (room) good for ethical deliberation, 
whereas the understanding of ‘moral space’ that I present is closer to a more 
abstract notion of “space” that is created by ethics. More precisely, it is 
a logical space created by the sum of the properties identified as moral.
Non-homogeneity of Moral Space
Let me introduce the following definition of ‘non-homogeneity.’ Any moral 
space in which (the) moral value (of an act) changes as a function of its 
2 Tilghman (1988) claims that Caravaggio’s space is “largely constituted by the human 
figure as an acting moral force.” This means that aesthetic characteristics of space in 
Caravaggio’s paintings can be fully appreciated only under the condition that we take 
into account the moral aspect of the human beings he represents. 
3 This definition of moral space may be extended to other living creatures when 
understood as persons.
4 Walker (1993). A moral thinker in this conception is envisaged as a “mediator in the 
moral conversation taking place” within moral spaces.45 Non-Homogenous Moral Space
positional characteristics, such as distance from the moral agent (in a relevant 
sense of the notion of the distance in moral space, to be defined below), will 
be termed non-homogeneous moral space. Alternatively, if moral space 
is homogeneous, moral value is independent of positional characteristics. 
To put it differently, a set of moral properties is non-homogeneous if 
at least one property which is a member of this set is relative to positional 
characteristics, and it is homogeneous otherwise. 
We may also speak of homogeneity and non-homogeneity of moral 
theories. By this terminological convention, a theory is homogeneous if it 
rejects any limitations of the extension of its moral maxims (if applied to the 
moral agents who enjoy the same moral status, e.g., to human beings). This 
means that in such a theory, all moral requirements pertain to every person 
if he or she finds herself in relevantly similar circumstances. Theories such 
as J. S. Mill’s utilitarianism and Kant’s theory of perfect duties, on their 
standard interpretations, are homogeneous, whereas Aristotle’s ethics of 
friendship is non-homogenous. 
The inherent value clause
For a theory to be non-homogeneous, the positional (or, in particular, 
indexical) reasons it accepts cannot be purely instrumental. For instance, 
J. S. Mill accepts partiality towards one’s kin and friends, which is 
a characteristic of non-homogenous theories; yet, he does so merely on rule 
utilitarian grounds. Mill believes that people are better motivated to maximize 
the general utility if the people they are trying to help are their kin (Mill 
1979). But the overarching goal of Mill’s ethics is to promote the greatest 
utility for the greatest number of people. Hence, his moral theory is best 
characterized as homogenous since the agent-relative value it incorporates 
is not inherent but instrumental.
This consideration leads us directly to the Inherent Value Clause: 
For a theory to be non-homogenous, it must accept inherent agent-relative 
moral value.5 A theory which maintains that, other things being equal, parents 
(rather than social workers or strangers) should read stories to their children 
5 This is the issue I discussed in my paper at the Inherent and Instrumental Value 
conference, organized by this society at D’Ouville College several years ago.46 Piotr Boltuc
because this tends to make children happier—is still a homogenous moral 
theory. This is because the agent-relative rule according to which these are 
people who should read stories to their children, is accepted only in so far 
as it maximizes general utility more than any alternative arrangements. Sen 
calls this kind of merely instrumental agent-relativity by the name of ‘doer- 
-relativity.’6
In contrast, common sense moral intuitions seem to indicate that in 
some circumstances it is morally wrong tout court to disregard certain 
positional characteristics of moral agents. The fact that X is my friend 
may justifiably influence my action towards her, even if this action is not 
justifiable on universal grounds (whether deontic, act- or rule-utilitarian, or 
otherwise). According to the inherent value clause, only theories that adopt 
the stance that positional characteristics may influence the inherent moral 
value of one’s action (viewer-relativity and self-evaluation relativity in Sen’s 
classification) will be seen as non-homogeneous. 
Propinquity
An unexpected example of a moral property that leads to the non-
homogeneity of a theory of which it is a part is Jeremy Bentham’s notion of 
propinquity. In his discussion of the circumstances relevant for estimating 
the value of pleasure or pain with reference to a single person, Bentham 
mentions the following characteristics: intensity, duration, certainty and, 
finally, “propinquity or remoteness” (Bentham).7 By propinquity, Bentham 
means something other than the certainty or uncertainty of future pleasure, 
which he mentions as a separate characteristic. Hence, uncertainty is not 
the only factor that is able to change our attitude toward a given pleasure 
in the distant future in comparison to a present one. There is, Bentham 
claims, another factor that could make my 20 utiles today more valuable to 
me than 27 utiles next year; this is just the proximity of my pleasure today 
that makes it more valuable to me today than a somewhat stronger pleasure 
in the distant future. 
6 I present Sen’s position later in this paper, in the section on Sen’s conception of 
agent-relativity.
7 Bentham (1948, ch. 4, sec. 2). 47 Non-Homogenous Moral Space
Bentham’s criterion of propinquity has been a source of puzzlement 
for many philosophers, especially utilitarians. Parfit refers to C. I. Lewis’s 
characterization of propinquity (his principle of fractional prudence) as 
clearly irrational.8 A resolute rejection of propinquity by contemporary 
utilitarians comes in part due to historic reasons; in particular, Immanuel 
Kant’s influence on Mill.9 Propinquity violates a general tenet of 
later utilitarianism that we may call “neutrality among the indexical 
characteristics of different pleasures and pains.” The value of pleasure and 
pain is not supposed to depend on its temporal and spatial location or on 
the characteristics of a particular agent.10 This position is quite consistent 
with later utilitarians’ general distrust of agent-relativity and their model of 
adopting homogenous moral space.
There is a tidy way to demonstrate the connection between Bentham’s 
propinquity in time and agent-relativity. The argument is Parfitian in style.11 
If I give credence to propinquity, I care more about experiences of mine 
now than about my experiences in the distant future. This attitude could 
be seen as violating the criterion of impartiality among different agents, 
since by caring more about my present pleasure and pain I treat my future 
and present self (different “momentary selves”) unequally. This is how 
propinquity in time may be seen as leading to a form of unequal concern 
for different moral patients.12 
I shall adopt a broad definition of propinquity by which it includes not 
only proximity in time and geographical space, but also social proximity, 
which Robert Pargetter calls, somewhat misleadingly, by the name of kinship. 
8 Similar objections have been raised towards generalized propinquity, which 
I introduce below. (It is similar to Sidgwick’s “duty of neighbourhood.”) He acknowledges 
that “one cannot easily sympathize with each individual in a multitude” and that “one 
sympathizes more easily with one’s like.” But, he claims, “[t]he duty of neighbourhood 
seems … only a particular application of the duty of general benevolence or humanity.” 
Sidgwick (1981, p. 251).
9 See Mill (1979, pp. 325–326). 
10 See Parfit (1984, pp. 117–136). 
11 It refers indirectly to the criteria of continuity and connectedness in personal identity.
12 John Cotthingam claims, to the contrary, that this may be a rather healthy approach. 
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Pargetter’s kinship argument
In a generally overlooked article on moral kinship, Pargetter13 
demonstrates why ‘proximity’, cast in terms of morally relevant ties, is 
an important moral feature. Denotation of his term kinship incorporates 
friendship, family ties, networks of friends and various kinds of communities.
Even Sidgwick (a utilitarian) agrees that non-homogenous moral 
theories—his Common Sense Morality—provide the best approximation 
of our everyday moral intuitions. As Pargetter points out, although we 
have a general moral intuition that teaches that to help someone is a good 
thing, we also have more paticularist moral intuitions that require a much 
stronger commitment to help “if the person involved is our spouse, or child, 
or a close friend.” It goes “against our entire moral fibre to decide to help 
the stranger rather than our spouse or child or friend.”14 
Traditional universalist ethics, which relies on general moral properties, 
is hard-pressed to accommodate these intuitions. This is a special problem 
for consequentialism.15 One customary reply of moral universalists is that 
ethics is a domain of universal rational claims, while intuitions which point 
to the contrary are subjective and hence either confused or irrelevant. Such 
a regulative definition of ethics is unpersuasive16 since it does not grasp an 
important point espoused by Pargetter. He notes that feelings that we have 
moral obligations toward certain particular persons that are stronger than 
those held towards others “are as strong and basic as any we experience. 
If these are to be put aside, why not others?”17 The last point is important 
since, as Pargetter argues in the same article, every system of ethics starts 
with some intuitive assumptions and therefore there is no reason to treat 
some of these intuitions as privileged over the others.
Within the theory presented by Pargetter, the strength of our moral 
obligations varies according to our closeness to particular persons in a given 
situation. (Interestingly, my closeness to different persons “in the kinship 
13 Pargetter (1991). 
14 Ibid.
15 Henceforth, I discuss primarily the consequentialist form of moral universalism.
16 Moreover, this reply is not available to moral particularists, or indeed to the followers 
of most forms of intuitionist moral realism. I return to this point later in this paper.
17 Pargetter (1991, p. 346). 49 Non-Homogenous Moral Space
sense” is based on different types of kinship—e.g., professional friendship, 
family ties or shared religious affiliation—and the strength of each varies 
under different circumstances.) Pargetter’s approach leaves us without 
a homogeneous theory of what is good, all things considered, independently 
of any particular features of a situation. As Pargetter put it, “[t]he fundamental 
judgments of goodness and badness will be relativized to a person at a time,”18 
so that moral judgments depend on positional properties. 
Pargetter’s relativistic, or rather relationistic, approach does not lead 
to moral skepticism, egoism or vulgar relativism19. His moral theory, which 
is a sophisticated version of utilitarianism, is closer to Einstein’s relativity 
theory in physics than to moral skepticism of any sort, since it allows us 
to specify well-defined moral duties. It differs from universalistic theories 
since the well-defined duties present in this theory are relative to the frames 
of reference in which they are assessed. (Such frames of reference may be 
provided by non-universal, agent relative characteristics, such as X’s position 
in the social network, for instance, by his friendships). No description of 
moral duties is complete if it fails to specify the reference frame in which it 
is assessed, just like, for instance, position of an object in Einstein’s physics 
cannot be assessed in abstraction from its physical reference frame. 
According to a relationistic (rather than relativistic, which sounds 
like moral relativism) moral theory, it may be morally good of me to help 
Frank, a friend of mine, instead of helping Paul, who is a stranger to me but 
a friend to you, while it may be good of you to do the opposite, because of 
the objectively existing ties of kinship. Consequently, in a relationistic moral 
theory the existence of special ties among given persons entails a certain 
special duty, or reason, to take their good into account as more important 
than the good of others.20 I shall develop this view a little further. The special 
duty of kinship (or neighborliness) changes the features of moral space 
18 Ibid., p. 354.
19 By the fact that Pargetter is not a primitive relativist I understand that he does not 
claim, as do many students taking their first classes in ethics, that certain things are 
good for Jack if Jack believes that they are good for him (or, if they accord with “Jack’s 
values”, or with the values of “Jack’s society”), whereas other things are good for Jane 
if they accord with “her values.”
20 Obviously, such situation leads to inter-personal moral dilemmas. I discuss this issue 
in the next section. 50 Piotr Boltuc
(defined as a set of morally relevant properties).21 Moral reasons are not 
impartial over the identities of moral agents and moral patients. Moral ties 
or, as Pargetter calls them, “objective morally relevant relations of kinship,” 
produce stronger moral obligations among certain persons and groups 
than among others. Hence, moral ties can be envisaged as fields, similar in 
structure to magnetic fields in physics which bind vectors of forces acting 
in physical space. The moral space, then, is non-homogeneous, creating 
curved vectors of moral obligation around certain agents. 
Is such a moral theory plausible? It would seem clearly implausible 
unless we had an agent-relative conception of value at our disposal. The 
structure of such a theory can be best understood using Sen’s analysis of 
agent-relativity.
Sen’s agent-relativity
Sen does not actually commit himself to accepting agent-relativity of value, 
but rather considers, with a sympathetic eye, what formal consequences 
follow from arguments for agent-relativity “if they are accepted.”22 Within an 
agent-relative system, the goodness of a state of affairs depends intrinsically 
“on the position of the evaluator in relation to the state.” The statement, 
“y is morally good,” is like the statement, “the sun is setting”: Its truth value 
depends on the position of observation. Hence, “morally good” is a two-place 
predicate (y is morally good from position Q), whereas “morally better” is 
even a three-place predicate (y is morally better than x from position Q).
What philosophers refer to as agent-relative values actually constitute 
several categories with different formal characteristics. Sen distinguishes 
three types of agent-relativity, defined as negations of the following neutrality 
claims:
Doer neutrality (DN): Person i may do this act if and only if 
person i may permit person j to do this act. Ai(i) <=> Ai(j).
21 Moral space can be defined, more precisely, as the complete collective set of properties 
of those weakly intentional actions which affect persons.
22 Sen (1983, p. 208). 51 Non-Homogenous Moral Space
Viewer neutrality (VN): Person i may do this act if and only if person j 
may permit person i to do this act. Ai(i) <=> Aj(i).
Self-evaluation neutrality (SN): Person i may do this act if and only if 
person j may do this act. Ai(i) <=> Aj(j).
Sen has discovered an interesting formal regularity. These three kinds 
of agent-neutrality are bilaterally dependent on each other, which means 
that any one form of agent-relativity entails one other form: “[I]f any one 
type of agent-relativity is satisfied, at least one other type of relativity will 
also obtain.”23 
Let me concentrate on the second, most radical kind of agent-relativity. 
Viewer-relative valuation of outcomes is sensitive to differences in the 
positions that different people occupy vis a vis states to be evaluated. Since 
these positions may differ, it may happen that “different people [correctly] 
evaluate the same state differently.”24 Morality recommends different 
and, on some occasions, incompatible solutions because moral statements 
are “positional.” By positional statements, Sen understands statements 
“reflecting the view of the state from the position of the evaluator.”25 He 
defines function Gki(x), which can be read: “the moral value that in the 
opinion of person k (parameter) should be appropriately attached to state x 
(variable) by person i (variable).”26 
Sen’s analysis encounters a few serious objections. As Donald Regan 
observes, the judgments of goodness-from-a-point-of-view must have 
two properties. First, “they must have significance beyond the immediate 
context of choosing and judging acts.” Second, they must be “essentially 
and ineradicably relative.”27
23 Sen calls these characteristics ‘bilaterally independent,’ but, as Ellen Paul has pointed 
out to me, this terminology makes little sense, since bilateral dependency is what Sen 
actually demonstrates. Ibid., p. 206.
24 Ibid., p. 213.
25 Ibid., p. 219.
26 Ibid., p. 216. I gather that the word ‘opinion’ in this sentence should be understood 
as equivalent to ‘a proper moral judgment’; otherwise, Sen would fail to avoid a form 
of vulgar moral relativism (opinion-relativism), which is his intention.
27 Ibid., p. 102.52 Piotr Boltuc
Regan’s first point of criticism of Sen’s approach is that “divergent 
points of view require conflict.”28 This issue can be formulated as a problem 
of interpersonal moral dilemmas, which emerge if agent A has the best 
moral reason to do X and agent B has the best moral reason to do Y, while X 
and Y are practically incompatible and there is no overarching value V such 
that we could adjudicate between X and Y (Sinnott-Armstrong). Replying 
to this objection, Sen declares, plausibly, that the absence of conflict would 
not be a merit of a moral theory if we accept moral realism.29 Yet, if such 
a theory is supposed to describe moral obligations that are independent of 
this theory, and the obligations actually conflict, a moral theory should not 
skirt this conflict.30 This question does not emerge for a moral anti-realist 
(or non-cognitivist) like Bernard Gert. But if we believe that there are moral 
truths to be discovered and that ethics is not a well-entrenched, internalized 
system of social coordination, Sen’s reply is satisfactory.31 
Regan’s other objection is based on his claim that moral judgments, 
unlike aesthetic judgments, face the following problem. Once we abandon 
the perspective of universal benevolence, it is not clear why an agent should 
evaluate a situation from his/her point of view rather than from the point 
of view of another person. This is a serious objection, which amounts to 
asking why anybody should act on agent-relative reasons (and whether this 
obligation is agent-relative as well). There are different ways to tackle this 
objection. One could try to adopt a complex framework that includes agent-
relative and agent-neutral reasons.32 In such a framework, agent-neutral 
28 Regan (1983, p. 107). 
29 Sen accepts moral realism. He argues: “[W]e are not discussing the choice of an 
instrument. If the correct view happens to incorporate inter-positional differences and 
conflict, then clearly it will be incorrect to insist on absence of conflicts” (Sen 1983, 
p. 126). Yet, he is somewhat agnostic on the issue of moral cognitivism, which may need 
to be reformulated if we adopt “the positional interpretation of moral statements” (ibid., 
p. 118).
30 Ibid., p. 118.
31 Ibid., pp. 114–115. In the last part of this paper, I address a further issue that follows 
from this point which has been raised by Derek Parfit, but (Boltuc 2007) is devoted 
primarily to this problem. 
32 In a paper, “Death of the Impartial Spectator,” presented for discussion at various 
colloquia, but never finished for publication, I call this approach “meta-impartial observer 
theory.” I am grateful to David Schmidtz, Henry West and David Sobel, who gave me 
helpful comments on this issue.53 Non-Homogenous Moral Space
reasons may not override the agent-relative ones. If they did, my inherent 
value clause would not be satisfied and an interpersonal dilemma would not 
be generated. Instead, the agent-neutral rules must be placed at a meta-level 
at which they are the objective rules of the game that each player has to 
follow, but the rules do not decide before the game which player should win; 
the actual play is to decide this. 
Within such a meta-ethical structure one would have to justify why 
agent-relativity is to be tolerated (one could refer to reasons of personal 
integrity or autonomy, if one were to build such an argument further). But 
this reply seems to be missing an important point. The gist of the problem 
(at least insofar as Sen’s criterion of viewer-relativity is concerned) is that 
there is no a priori privileged reference frame to adjudicate among different 
agent-relative and agent-neutral values.33 If there is no such privileged 
reference frame, we do not know what the basis of normativity of these 
various so-called values is, which is the point of Regan’s objection.
Sen’s reply to Regan’s objection is simpler; it is based on an ethics of 
identity. The reply starts directly with the idea that personal identity34—for 
instance, one’s role as a parent, a friend or a compatriot—results in objective 
moral reasons. This move shifts justification to normative philosophical 
anthropology: Reasons come with social roles. Moreover, Sen emphasizes 
that people are not free to choose moral norms incompatible with their 
social role. The fact that an agent is not free to follow an ethos unbecoming 
of his/her social identity is an objective fact, just like any other facts in the 
world. If somebody is John’s mother or a head-physician in a hospital, he or 
she must follow one of a cluster of ethical directives compatible with their 
identities. And if John is the patient, those clusters are not identical. Also, 
if the same person is both the mother and the physician, a third cluster is 
created that incorporates some of the rights and duties from the previous 
sets of moral obligations, but not all of them; professional ethics deals with 
those kinds of issues. Those specific, and often conflicting, identities provide 
33 Having attempted to pursue this path in my earlier conference paper (“Is It Sometimes 
Required Morally to Be Partial”, American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 
Seattle 1996), I moved on to endorsing Sen’s solution to this problem based on Ch. Taylor 
and A. Macintyre’s version of ethics of identity.
34 Charles Taylor’s approach fits with Sen’s at this point.54 Piotr Boltuc
bearers of these roles with reasons to view situations from the point of view 
of the appropriate person.
Another vital aspect of Sen’s theory, which I am unable to discuss in 
any detail within the confines of this paper, is his ‘mixed framework’ of broad 
consequentialism that combines deontic and consequentialist reasons in the 
moral calculus. Sen claims that although agent-neutrality has been a feature 
of consequentialism because of historic contingencies, there is nothing in 
the very structure of consequence-based moral theories that would require 
agent-neutrality. Sen’s mixed framework, called “the system of consequence-
based evaluation” or “broad consequentialism,” in which value has been 
defined in mixed consequentialist-deontic terms (such as “goal-rights”), 
closely approximates Pargetter’s version of utilitarianism presented in the 
paper on kinship and, importantly, it fits with popular intuitions.35 
Let me draw some conclusions from this discussion: It seems that 
Regan’s objection is detrimental to Pargetter’s point that there are objective, 
morally relevant relations (such as kinship), since there seems to be no 
privileged point of view from which this claim can be established. Yet, 
Sen’s reply in terms of ethics of identity is immune to this criticism. Regan’s 
objection may be able to force Sen into a corner, which makes his position 
less than plausible on other counts. Although an ethics of identity would 
be endorsed by such writers as Michael Walzer, Charles Taylor, Alastair 
MacIntyre and Virginia Held, it is rejected by many mainstream moral 
theorists who follow Locke’s (or Kant’s) universal definition of moral 
agents. It is not clear that a defense of non-homogeneity of moral space 
needs to rely on a vision of personal identity (social identity) implied by 
an ethics of identity, but an argument to this effect goes beyond the scope 
of this paper36. The goal of this paper is more modest: It is to demonstrate 
that the structure of a theory that accepts non-homogenous moral space is 
generally defensible even though such a defense may lack a plausible level 
of generality.
35 Incidentally, if Sen is right, Jonathan Dancy seems mistaken in believing that agent-
relative consequentialism cannot be achieved. See J. Dancy (1993). 
36 I discuss some of those broader social issues in Boltuc (2001), which presents 
a somewhat more popular version of the gist of the current argument.55 Non-Homogenous Moral Space
Parfit’s Self-Defeatingness Argument
Sen’s positional interpretation of morality does not escape the problem 
faced by any version of Common Sense Morality (i.e., morality that ascribes 
a special value to particular moral ties). This is the problem with practical 
consistency. This problem has been given a detailed discussion by D. Parfit 
in terms of the theory of rationality. Parfit agrees that although Common 
Sense Morality generates interpersonal moral dilemmas, it does not fail in its 
own terms. This is because it contains a version of viewer-relativity, which 
defines its objective from a viewer-relative point of view and does not claim 
to adjudicate among different agents. However, he argues that such a system 
violates broader rationality.37
Parfit’s main criticism of Common Sense Morality is that it produces 
the following situation: (1) It gives different agents different aims; (2) the 
achievement of each person’s aims partly depends on what other people do; 
yet, (3) “what each does will not affect what these others do.”38 Actually, 
Parfit should have also covered cases of direct competition which are 
clearly allowed by conditions (1) and (2). In these cases, “what each agent 
does” will affect what others do in a negative way.39 He argues that agent-
relative theories, both Common Sense Morality and Self-Interest Theory,40 
are directly collectively self-defeating because the goals they give to an 
agent may collide with those given to others and therefore frustrate the 
goals of the first agent. To put it simply, Parfit claims that Common Sense 
Morality leads to the frustration of more goals (accepted by it) than would 
be frustrated by the adoption of an impartial system of ethics. I argue that 
this is a contingent claim dependent on particulars of the situation and on the 
method of evaluation of these goals. In particular, Parfit’s approach prejudges 
the case by providing goals with assigned agent-neutral value (as opposed, 
for instance, to doer-relative evaluations of various states of affairs). Let us 
focus on a different problem, though.
37 This material is covered in: ibid.
38 Parfit (1984, p. 95). 
39 Even in reference to coordination games, what Parfit shows later in this section is 
not that agents do not affect each other, but that (at least in some cases) they affect each 
other in the wrong way.
40 Self-Interest Theory is a version of moral egoism defined by Parfit.56 Piotr Boltuc
In his critique of Common Sense Morality, Parfit has confused two 
separate, though closely linked, decision-theoretic problems: coordination 
problems below the edge of optimal solutions and zero-sum games on this 
edge.41 Those who accept non-homogeneous moral space need to agree that 
in some sub-domains of morality we face competitive situations. We talk 
about moral conflicts such that the moral reasons that agents have lead to 
practically incompatible actions and, in such situations, there are no more 
general principles given by morality that would take precedence over 
particular moral reasons of the agents. Hence, we lack a principle with the 
authority to adjudicate between their competing claims; this leads to moral 
competition. 
There is a certain problem with this position. Since such competitions 
among moral agents need to be adjudicated by non-moral means (hopefully 
fair ones),42 their results may be viewed as morally arbitrary. Such 
arbitrariness may be morally relevant only if we accept moral luck.43 Hence, 
it seems that a defense of non-homogenous moral theories requires us to 
accept moral luck; otherwise, Parfit’s point wins the day.44 
41 Coordination (or non-zero sum) games are games in which all players can improve 
their situation. Therefore, they can benefit from cooperation. But in many games there 
exists the so called ‘edge of optimal solutions’—a set of situations in which the players 
cooperate so well that there are no further benefits from cooperation to be had. If the 
game is to continue after the edge of optimal solutions has been reached, it transforms 
itself into a perfectly competitive game. In perfectly competitive games (or distribution 
games), benefits of one player come at the expense of another player or group thereof. 
42 Auctions, duels, major league baseball games and entrance exams to Harvard are 
examples of non-moral competitive games. Procedural fairness of these games is an 
ethical feature, but it does not make these games a part of ethics since fairness is just 
one of the circumstances in which the games may take place, whereas the substance of 
the games is non-moral. 
43 This leads us not only the issue of moral luck, but also relates to the problem of moral 
responsibility in the context of the problem of free will, discussed well by R. Ingarden 
in his work On responsibility.
44 This is why it seems that non-homogeneity of moral space requires its discontinuity, 
which makes moral luck possible. But the issue of moral luck belongs to a different paper, 
“Moral Luck and Realistic Obligation,” which is my next, nearly finished project. 57 Non-Homogenous Moral Space
Conclusion
My purpose is not to decide whether moral space is homogenous or not. 
It is rather to demonstrate that a discussion at the level of properties or 
sets of moral properties may be fruitful; homogeneity is just an example. 
If my argument is correct, I have established that according to a defensible 
moral theory such as Sen’s or Pargetter’s, the structure of moral reasons (or 
obligations) in an agent-relative theory is “curved” around agents or their 
groups. Consequently, in this framework, the moral obligations of agent 
A depend in part on positional characteristics (e.g., the identity of the moral 
patients toward whom she acts). Theories that accept this last assumption 
operate within a non-homogeneous set of moral properties; hence, this set 
exhibits some philosophically interesting properties. 
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